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Family composition has changed dramatically over the past 25 years. Divorce rates increased and 
remarriage rates declined. While considerable research established a link between marriage and 
earnings, far less is empirically understood about the effect of marriage on wealth although 
wealth is an important measure for older individuals because it represents resources available for 
consumption in retirement. In this paper we employ eight waves of panel data from the Health 
and Retirement Study to study the relationship between wealth changes and marital status among 
individuals over age 50. This research advances understanding of the relationship by first, 
incorporating measures of current and lifetime earnings, mortality risk and other characteristics 
that vary by marital status into models of wealth change; second, measuring the magnitude of 
wealth loss and gain associated with divorce, widowing and remarriage and third, estimating 
wealth change before and after marital status change so the change in wealth change is not the 
result of individuals entering or leaving the household and other sources of unobserved 
differences are removed from estimates of the effect of marriage on wealth. Our results suggest 
no differences in wealth change over time among individuals that remain married, divorced, 
widowed, never married and partnered over 7 years. In the short-run there are substantial wealth 
changes associated with marital status changes. Divorce at older ages is costly, remarriage is 
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1.  Introduction 
Family composition has changed dramatically over the past 25 years. Divorce 
rates rapidly increased from the late 1960’s through the 1980’s and remarriage rates have 
declined (Cherlin 1992).  Considerable research has established a correlation between 
marital status and socio-economic status, particularly a positive relationship between 
marriage and male earnings (Korenman and Neumark 1991; Lundberg and Rose 2002; 
Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2009).  Considerably less attention has been paid to the 
effect of marriage on women’s earnings because of the strong correlation of marriage and 
childbearing.  One exception is Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009) and they find 
marriage lowers female wages the year of marriage and wage growth in subsequent years.  
While income is a critical measure of well being, wealth is an important complementary 
measure and arguably the most important measure for older individuals because it 
represents resources available for consumption in retirement.  Far less is empirically 
understood about the effect of marriage on wealth compared to the effect of marriage on 
earnings although theory suggests it is likely to be important. 
An important implication of economic models of savings with no uncertainty (or 
agents maximize expected utility) and perfect capital markets is that consumption is 
determined by permanent income.  This implies that changes in permanent income are 
consumed and temporary changes are saved.  Relaxing these assumptions provides a role 
for both permanent and transitory income in consumption and savings decisions.  
Changes in marital status that affect permanent income will change consumption levels.  
Moreover, changes in marital status will affect wealth depending on whether the change 




separation or divorce expected to be temporary may be to lower savings to avoid a drop 
in consumption.  Lupton and Smith (2002) find dissaving is most common the shorter the 
duration in the non-marriage state as households attempt to maintain prior consumption 
levels.  Consumption and savings behavior may change prior to the event. For example, 
Zagorsky (2005) found that savings declines begin prior to divorce.  
Other hypotheses regarding the effect of marriage on wealth include economies of 
scale (Waite 1995), mortality risk (Lillard and Weiss 1996), children and inter-vivos 
transfers and bequests (Hurd, Smith, Zissimopoulos 2006), precautionary savings 
(Mincer 1978) and retirement planning.  Married couples may consume many goods and 
services jointly (entertainment, housing) for the same cost as a single person.  These 
economies of scale may translate into additional wealth or additional consumption.  
Marriage may produce better health, thus married couples will save more to protect 
against outliving their resources. On the other hand, marriage reduces risk associated with 
fluctuations in income and thus may lower precautionary savings against income shocks 
or other shocks.1  In sum, there are many pathways through which marriage and wealth 
are associated.  Moreover, the consistent empirical finding of a relationship between 
marriage and wealth suggests its importance as an area for further study.  Yet, 
challenging estimation of the empirical relationship between marriage and wealth is the 
non-random sorting of individuals into marriage.  For example, low-income families are 
more likely to divorce or experience widowhood than high-income families. Prior 
empirical studies have been hindered by a lack of control measures for permanent income 
                                                
1 Children are one important reason for marriage and their presence may either increase savings (to leave as 




and by use of cross-sectional surveys and short panels that are ill-suited for distinguishing 
between selection and behavioral response.   
In this paper we employ eight waves of panel data from the Health and 
Retirement Study to study the relationship between wealth changes and marital status 
among individuals over age 50.  This research advances understanding of the relationship 
by first, incorporating measures of current and lifetime earnings, mortality risk and other 
characteristics that vary by marital status into models of wealth change; second, 
measuring the magnitude of wealth loss and gain associated with divorce, widowing and 
remarriage and third, estimating wealth change before and after marital status change so 
the change in wealth change is not the result of individuals entering or leaving the 
household and other sources of unobserved differences are removed from estimates of the 
effect of marital status on wealth. The remainder of this paper has the following structure. 
The next section summarizes describes the data and derivation of key variables.  Section 
3 presents main results for wealth levels and changes and for individuals that do and do 
not change marital status.  The final section concludes. 
 
2. Data  
 The research relies on longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement 
Study, a set of biennial surveys first fielded in 1992 and 1993 by the University of 
Michigan with the objective to monitor economic transitions in work, income and wealth, 
and changes in health among those over 50 years old.2   We use data from survey waves 
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and biennial thereafter to 2006.3 
                                                
2 The first survey, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) began as a national sample of about 7,600 




We use data including all cohorts with the exception of the 1948 to 1953 birth 
cohort added in year 2004 for which insufficient waves of data for this analysis have been 
collected.  In addition, we use restricted data on Social Security earnings to compute a 
measure of lifetime earnings.  Marital history variables (all prior marriages, divorces and 
widowings) were derived based on the raw HRS files; most other variables used in the 
study are from the RAND HRS Data file, Version I4.  Further details on key analytic 
variables follow. 
Marital Status.  Respondents are categorized at a point in time as being either 
married, divorced, widowed, partnered or never married. For some analyses we use 
respondents’ reports of past marital events to distinguish between married and remarried 
individuals.  Changes over the panel are based on respondents’ report of any changes 
between waves and we group them into six categories:  separated to divorced, married to 
divorced, married to widowed, divorced to married, widowed to married, other single 
(partnered or never married) to married.  
Lifetime Earnings.  We calculate lifetime earnings based on historical earnings 
reported to the Social Security Administration.   We use earnings from 1951 to 1991 for 
9,539 HRS respondents.5  Earnings data for the War Babies cohort are available for 1,330 
                                                                                                                                            
51-61 years old at the wave 1 interview in 1992).  The second, the Assets and Health Dynamics of the 
Oldest Old (AHEAD), began in 1993 and included 6,052 households (8,222 individuals) with at least one 
person born in 1923 or earlier (70 or over in 1993).  In 1998, HRS was augmented with baseline interviews 
from at least one household member from the birth cohorts 1924-1930 and 1942-1947 and was 
representative of all birth cohorts born in 1947 or earlier.   In 2004, the HRS was again augmented with 
interviews from the birth cohort 1948-1953. 
3 For the original HRS respondents from survey wave 1992, we use a total of 8 waves of data from 1992 to 
2006.  For the original AHEAD respondents from 1993, we have 7 waves of data.  For respondents added 
in 1998, we have 5 survey waves from 1998 to 2006. 
4 RAND HRS is a longitudinal data set based on the HRS data and developed at RAND with funding from 
the National Institute on Aging and the Social Security Administration. 
5 See Haider and Solon (2000) for a discussion of characteristics of individuals with and without matched 




respondents for years 1951 to 1997.   The administrative records are accurate and less 
subject to measurement error than self-reported earnings from household surveys and 
cover a long history of earnings.  They are however, limited in two ways.  First, the level 
of earnings is reported only up to the Social Security maximum.  This maximum changed 
over time as did the number of individuals whose earnings were above the maximum.  
Second, individuals employed in a sector not covered by Social Security have no earnings 
records for the years he or she is employed in the uncovered sector.6  Lifetime earnings 
are calculated as the present discounted value (3 percent real interest rate) of real Social 
Security earnings adjusted to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U-RS, and we adjust for the 
upper truncation of Social Security earnings.  
Mortality Risk, Risk Aversion, Time Rate of Preference.  Mortality risk is the 
respondent’s subjective survival assessment of living to age 75 (85) on a zero to 100 
scale and we include it in empirical models as the deviation from lifetables based on sex 
and age. The basis for categorizing the level of risk aversion is a series of questions that 
ask respondents to choose between pairs of jobs where one job guarantees current family 
income and the other offers the chance to increase income and carries the risk of loss of 
income.  From responses to these questions we categorize a respondent’s level of risk 
aversion into four groups.  We measure respondents’ time rate of preference by their 
responses to the length of time they use for financial planning.  The answers are 
categorical from a few months to over ten or more years. 
Wealth.  Our main outcome measures are wealth, change in wealth and the change 
in the change in wealth.   Wealth is housing plus non-housing wealth and is computed as 
the sum of wealth from real estate, businesses, IRAs, stocks, bonds, checking accounts, 
                                                




CDs, and housing, less the value of the mortgage, home loans, and other debt.  Missing 
data on wealth are imputed and the methods are described in RAND HRS Version I.  
Some analysis use information on a respondent’s pension ownership and type (defined 
benefit, defined contribution, both).  
 
3.  Results 
Changes in marital status occur over the lifespan, even at older ages.   We 
examine current marital status and future changes in marital status over the next 14 years 
and present their distribution in Table 1. Among the birth cohort 1931-1941, 84 percent 
are married in 1992, 10 percent are divorced and 6 percent are widowed. Over the next 14 
years, 15 percent of this sample of respondents, on average 55 years old, change marital 
status.  About 4 percent of married respondents divorce and 10 percent are widowed.  
Just over one percent of individuals divorced or widowed remarries over this time period.   
The level of wealth held in 1992 by this birth cohort varies with current marital 
status as well as future changes in marital status.  The first three rows in Table 2 are 
groups that, as of 1992, have not experienced a marital disruption.  The data in Table 2 
shows respondents that are married in 1992 and have no marital status changes over the 
next 14 years have higher mean and median wealth than married respondents that will 
eventually divorce or be widowed.  This group of continuously married individuals has 
on average $363,814 in housing and non-housing wealth (not including pension wealth) 
compared to $278,365 for married respondents that will divorce and compared to 
$254,362 for married respondents that will be widowed.  Age differences by group are 




individuals that remain married through the 14 years have lower average wealth 
($281,843) than married individuals who remain married over the panel, and at the mean 
and median, only marginally higher than those married that will go on to divorce or be 
widowed.  All not married individuals have lower mean wealth than married individuals 
although at the median, not married individuals who remarry in panel have higher median 
wealth than some married individuals.   Among the not married groups, mean wealth of 
divorced ($116,572) and widowed ($125,835) individuals that remain not married is 
about 60% of the wealth that not married individuals that go on to remarry have 
($188,366 and $199,769 respectively for divorced then remarried and widowed and then 
remarried).   
The wealth differences at about age 55 by current marital status and future 
changes may be a result of wealth loss due to marital disruption or observable differences 
in for example, earnings or preferences for savings.  For example, marital groups may 
save at similar rates but save out of lower levels of income.  Table 2 also shows lifetime 
earnings, current earnings and the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings.  Comparing 
individuals that are married and stay married with those that are married and go on to 
divorce, Table 2 shows that lifetime earnings and current earnings are similar and thus 
differences in earnings over the life-cycle is unlikely to account for the wealth 
differences.  Remarried individuals that stay remarried have slightly higher lifetime 
earnings, same current earnings and yet, their mean wealth is 77 percent of the wealth of 
individuals that are married (not remarried) and stay married over the panel.  This is 
pattern is consistent with wealth loss due to marital disruption.  Not married individuals 




earnings are lower than married individuals.  In sum, these data in Table 2 emphasize the 
role of lifetime earnings, the role of selection on characteristics other than income and the 
role of wealth loss due to marital dissolution in explaining wealth level differences by 
marital status. 
 
Changes in wealth among individuals with stable marital status.   
The magnitude of wealth change over time among individuals that change marital 
status will be dominated by wealth change due to individuals leaving or entering the 
household.  Thus we first examine wealth changes over two years (all data waves (t) and 
(t+1)) for individuals that do not change marital status over that same time period and 
results are shown in Table 3.7  Wealth increases over two years for all groups.  Married 
and remarried individuals have larger wealth changes than divorced, widowed, never 
married and partnered individuals.  Compared to all other individuals wealth change is 
higher for married individuals by the following amounts: $3,222 compared to remarried, 
$10,142 compared to divorced, $17,317 compared to widowed, $11,627 compared to 
never married and $17,115 compared to partnered. Wealth change as a percent of initial 
wealth level is slightly higher for divorced individuals (9 percent) than married, 
remarried and never married (7 percent). Wealth change as a percent of initial wealth 
level is 3 percent among widowed and partnered individuals.  Thus, overall levels of 
wealth change are highest for married individuals but rates are similar compared to 
divorced and never married individuals.  
                                                




We examine two-year wealth change by marital status controlling for basic 
demographic differences in sex, race and age and including year indicators.  Results from 
the linear, multivariate model are reported in the first column of results in Table 4 (Model 
1).  The second column of results in Table 4 (Model 2) are estimates of the marginal 
effects of marital status on wealth change over two-years from a model that along with 
basic demographics, includes in the specification many other covariates including 
lifetime earnings (a measure of permanent income), current earnings, education, number 
of children, ownership of pension wealth and type of pension, mortality risk, risk 
aversion, and financial planning horizon.  The marginal effects for all covariates are 
given in Appendix Table A.  The results from Model 1 show remarried and all not 
married individuals have lower levels of wealth change over two years and the magnitude 
of difference is similar to the difference in Table 3.  The inclusion of the additional 
covariates (Model 2) explains all of the difference in wealth change between married and 
remarried individual.  The covariates reduce the difference in wealth change between 
married and remarried in Model 1 and Model 2 by  $1,192 (27 percent) and the difference 
is no longer statistically significant.  The additional covariates in Model 2 explain about 
50% of the wealth change difference between married and either divorced or widowed 
individuals.  That is, the marginal effect is reduced from $-9,792 in Model 1 to $-5,146 in 
Model 2 for divorced individuals and from $-15,886 to $-7,922 for widowed individuals. 
The additional covariates in Model 2 explain about 30% of the wealth change difference 
between married and either never married or partnered individuals.  Overall, measures of 




risk explain between 30 and 50 percent of the difference in wealth between married and 
not married individuals.   
Table 5 presents results for the effect of marital status on wealth change 
separately for samples of men and women.  For men, demographic characteristics 
(included in Model 1) explain all of the difference in wealth change between married, 
remarried and not married men with the exception of partnered men.  The inclusion of the 
additional covariates in Model 2 explains about 30 percent of the difference between 
married men and partnered men.  For women, wealth change is lower for remarried and 
all not married women compared to married women with the exception of never married 
women.  The inclusion of the additional covariates in Model 2 explains all of the 
difference between married and remarried or never married women, 40 percent of the 
difference between married and divorced women, 49 percent of the difference between 
married and widowed women and 30 percent of the difference between partnered and 
married women.   
In sum, basic demographics explain all of the difference in wealth change by 
marital status for men (exception is partnered men), but not so for women.   For women, 
the inclusion of additional controls for socio-economic status and other household and 
individual characteristics explains all of the difference between married and remarried 
women and between one third and one half of the difference between married women and 
other not married women.  Thus for women, some of the variation is left unexplained.  
 




To study wealth change in panel among individuals that change marital status, we 
examine wealth levels and changes in the two waves prior to the marital status change (t-
1 and t), the two years over which the marital status change occurred (t and t+1) and the 
two years after the marital status change occurred (t+1 and t+2).  Thus we limit our 
sample to individuals in four consecutive waves of data and exclude individuals with 
more than one marital change between survey waves.8  We also study wealth changes 
over the same time periods for individuals that do not change marital status.   Results on 
wealth levels and changes are given in Table 6a and wealth changes as a percentage of 
the prior wave wealth level in Table 6b.   
Among married and separated individuals that divorce between waves, wealth is 
already declining in the wave prior to the divorce (Table 6a). Married individuals that are 
divorced in time t+1 experienced a $39,918 wealth loss while married from time (t-1) to 
(t), or 14 percent of their time (t-1) wealth (Table 6b).  Over the two years in which the 
divorced occurred, married individuals lost another $132,779 in wealth or about 53 
percent of their time (t) wealth.  There is some wealth recovery after the divorce:  wealth 
increased by $22,210 or 19 percent. The dissaving before the divorce and savings after 
the divorce lead to a wealth change of $62,128 from before ((t-1) to (t)), to after ((t+2)-
(t+1)) the divorce.  Separated individuals have wealth declines of $42,858 over the two 
years they are separated ((t)-(t-1)) and prior to the divorce, which is 27 percent of their 
time (t-1) wealth.  Unlike married couples that divorce, separated individuals have wealth 
increases during the wave in which they divorce and the wave in which they are divorced.  
                                                
8 We analyze characteristics of this sample restricted to be in four consecutive waves and find no 
statistically significant differences in average age, education, number of children, mean and median wealth 
or earnings.  Although the differences are not statistically different, the sample in four consecutive waves 




Wealth change is positive for all groups that change marital status, after the 
change.  In fact, the wealth change from t+1 to t+2 for married to divorced, divorced to 
married and married to married is similar and is between $22,000 and $25,000 but 
represents a larger percentage of wealth for divorced individuals who went from married 
to divorced.  The wealth change experience of married individuals who are widowed 
between time (t) and (t+1) is much different than those who divorced.  There is no 
significant wealth loss in the years before the widowing occurred, the widowing results in 
a wealth decline of $11,602 over two years or about 5 percent of their married (pre-
widowed) wealth at time (t).  
Divorced individuals that remarry accumulate assets while divorced (change (t-1) 
to (t) is $35,565) at a higher level and rate than those who remain divorced ($11,019).  
Assets enter the household with marriage:  wealth levels increase $64,789 between waves 
that individuals go from divorced to married and then level back to levels and rates 
similar to those individuals who remain married.  Widow and other singles (never 
married and partners) that marry also show substantial increases in wealth over the waves 
in which they get married and then a smaller increase in (in level and rate) the following 
waves in which they are married.  
In sum, divorce is associated with wealth loss and the loss in wealth begins before 
the divorce occurs and wealth recovery in the form of increased savings after the divorce.  
In contrast, a widowing is associated with much a smaller magnitude of wealth loss.  
Remarriage and marriage (for never married) is associated with increases in wealth at the 
time of remarriage consistent with the addition of an individual bringing wealth into the 





Empirical models of the change in the change in wealth 
 Demographic controls, measure of lifetime and current earnings and other rich 
measures of characteristics accounted for all of the differences in wealth change by 
marital status among men (exception is partnered men) and some of the difference among 
women for samples of individuals that did not change marital status. If there is remaining 
unobserved heterogeneity correlated with marital status then the marginal effects of 
marital status on wealth change will be biased.  We eliminate unobserved heterogeneity 
fixed over time (e.g. prudence) and measure the effect of marital status and changes in 
income growth with additional controls for age and year by estimating models of the 
change in wealth change.  We estimate wealth change for individuals that change marital 
status, before and after the marital status change so measured wealth change is not 
primarily the result of individuals entering or leaving the household.  That is, we use 
change in wealth change [(t+2)-(t+1)] – [(t)-(t-1)] and the change ((t+1)-(t)) is the wave 
in which marital status changed and is omitted from the calculation.   
Our model of the change in wealth change, for a sample of respondents that are 
present in 4 consecutive waves, includes all possible marital statuses (excluded is 
married, no change over time), change in the change in income over this same time 
period, age, sex and year indicators.9  Estimation results are given in Table 7 for all 
respondents and separately for males and females.  The top and bottom 2 percent of the 
dependent variable (change in wealth change) is trimmed.   If there is no change in 
savings behavior, we would expect the change in the change to be small.  The mean 
                                                
9 We include all respondents from birth cohorts 1947 or earlier.  Restricting the sample to respondents in 
the 1931-1941 and 1942-1947 cohorts as we do in the model with results shown in Tables 4 and 5 does not 




dependent variable is $4,188.  We discuss the findings noting that the standard errors 
around most estimates are large so few statistically differences are found.   
Consistent with our earlier findings from models of wealth change on a sample of 
individuals that do not change marital status, the magnitude of effect of marital status on 
the change in wealth change among individuals that remain divorced, widowed or single 
over the four waves is small and not different than for individuals that remain married.  
For example the change in wealth change is $912 less among divorced individuals 
compared to married individuals and $3,266 less for widows compared to married 
individuals (Table 7).  The difference in the change in wealth change between widows 
and married individuals decrease from the mean difference (Table 6a) once age controls 
are added. Among women, there is no difference in the change in wealth change of 
women that stay divorced, widowed or other single women over the four waves 
(partnered or never married) compared to married women that remain married.  
The marginal effects on marital status changes from married or separated to 
divorced or widowed are positive suggesting transition to a not married state is leading to 
higher savings relative to the change in savings of married couples. As we saw in Table 
6a, the large positive change in wealth change is due to dissaving that occurs in the waves 
before the wave in which the divorce occurs and the ‘recovery’ of savings in the divorced 
state.  The inclusion of the change in income change does reduce the magnitude from 
those reported in Table 6a.  Individuals that divorce from a married state have a change in 
wealth change that is $46,858 higher than individuals that remain married. The difference 
in the change in wealth change between married individuals that divorce and those that 




once controls are added. This estimate is lower for men ($41,494) than women ($50,478). 
Married individuals that are widowed have a slightly higher change in savings compared 
to individuals that remain married ($3,494).  Widowed men have a small decline in 
savings and women a small increase relative to men and women that remain married.     
Divorced individuals that remarry have a change in savings that is less ($-17,606) 
than individuals that remain married. Widowed men and women that marry have a 
change in wealth change that is more ($31,907) than individuals that remain married.    
The estimates are imprecisely measured and the inclusion of change in income change 
and age does not change the magnitude of the difference relative to married couples 
reported in Table 6a.  The effects are different for men and women.  For divorced and 
widowed women, remarriage leads to a higher change in wealth change than married 
women while for men it leads to a lower change.  
Change in savings is declining with age slowly ($-539) but more rapidly for men 
($-712) than women ($-444).  Savings increases with the change in income growth. For 
example, a $1,000 increase in income growth (change in change in income) increases the 
change in wealth change by $208 ($241 and $191 for men and women respectively).  
We interpret these findings cautiously.  Model estimates of the effects of marital 
status on change in wealth change are imprecisely measured.  Moreover, the estimates on 
individuals that change marital status are based on short-term changes – changes in 
savings behavior immediately before and after a marital status event and not reflecting 
long-term savings behavior. Indeed we find no difference in the change in wealth change 
between individuals that remain divorced, widowed or single and married over the four 




savings.  That is, wealth change will include capital gains or losses and other transfers 
into the household through mechanisms such as pension and inheritance but not through 
the marital transition itself. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 By comparing wealth levels and lifetime earnings at age 55 of married and 
remarried individuals by whether they go on to divorce over the next 14 years or not, we 
found patterns consistent with the role of both selection and wealth loss due to marital 
dissolution in explaining why married individuals around age 55 have higher wealth than 
not married individuals.  Among individuals with a stable marital status over time, we 
find the higher savings of couples compared to not married men (except partners) is 
accounted for by observable differences in economic status, pensions and mortality risk. 
Observable differences account for between a third and one-half of the mean savings 
differences between married and divorced, widowed and partnered women and all of the 
difference between couples and never married women.  Estimates from models that 
control for fixed and unobserved heterogeneity by modeling the change in wealth change 
reveal no difference in the change in wealth change for men and women that are not 
married consistently over four waves compared to men and women married consistently 
over four consecutive waves.  There is wealth change associated with changes in marital 
status.  Divorce is associated with wealth loss beginning while married -  between four 
and two years before the divorce occurs- substantially more wealth loss over the two 
years that the individual transitions from married to divorced, and wealth recovery in the 




wealth at the time of marriage consistent with the addition of an individual bringing 
wealth into the household and followed by future wealth increases at rates similar to 
those who do not change marital status. Divorce at older ages is costly and remarriage is 
wealth enhancing and people appear to respond to marital status changes by changing 
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Table 1.  Distribution of Marital Status in 1992 and Changes 1992-2006 
 
1992 Marital Status and Any Change 1992-2006: No. Obs. Percent 
Married in 1992 & no change 7,411 70.0 
Married in 1992 & divorced 407 3.8 
Married in 1992 & widowed 1,082 10.2 
Divorced in 1992 & no change 962 9.1 
Divorced in 1992 & remarried 106 1.0 
Widowed in 1992 & no change 583 5.5 
Widowed in 1992 & remarried  34 0.3 
All 10,585 100.0 
Source:  HRS 1992-2006 
Notes:  Sample birth cohort 1931-1941 in 1992 (HRS wave 1).  Excludes 47 observations with unknown 




Table 2. Wealth, Lifetime and Current Earnings in 1992 by Marital Status in 1992 and Changes 1992-2006 
 
  Median Mean Ratio 
 N Wealth Wealth LTE Earnings Wealth/LTE 
Married in 1992 & no change 5,472 173,457 363,814 1,241,020 57,201 0.293 
Married in 1992 & divorced 204 99,919 278,365 1,026,509 60,821 0.271 
Married in 1992 & widowed 760 121,618 254,362 923,538 37,259 0.275 
Remarried in 1992 & no change 1939 125,311 281,843 1,346,968 57,668 0.209 
Remarried in 1992 & divorced 203 85,080 232,421 1,215,924 46,496 0.191 
Remarried in 1992 & ever widowed  322 98,271 201,530 1,021,238 35,652 0.197 
Divorced in 1992 & no change 962 33,175 116,572 636,788 24,444 0.183 
Divorced in 1992 & ever remarried  106 105,525 188,366 888,625 42,503 0.212 
Widowed in 1992 & no change 583 47,684 125,835 403,610 14,904 0.312 
Widowed in 1992 & ever remarried  34 129,137 199,769 521,556 26,421 0.383 
All 10585 129,928 293,975 1,127,296 49,511 0.261 
Source:  HRS 1992-2006 
Notes:  Sample birth cohort 1931-1941 in 1992 (HRS wave 1).  Excludes 47 observations with unknown 




Table 3.  Wealth Change Over 2 Years Among Individuals with No Change in Marital Status  
 
  Mean  
 N (t) (t+1) ∆ =(t+1)-(t) 
∆ as % of 
wealth at (t) 
Married 51,444 349,951 372,545 22,595 6.5 
Remarried 17,576 285,050 304,423 19,373 6.8 
Divorced 8,321 136,889 149,342 12,453 9.1 
Widowed 19,358 161,955 167,234 5,278 3.3 
Never Married 2,928 155,061 166,029 10,968 7.1 
Partnered 2,315 206,856 212,337 5,480 2.6 
All 101,942 276,824 294,024 17,200 6.2 
Source:  HRS 1992-2006 






Table 4.  Model Results for Wealth Change Among Individuals Not Changing Marital Status 
 
 Wealth Change 
 Marginal effects 
Variable Model (1)  Model (2)  
[Married]     
Remarried -4,432 ** -3,240  
Divorced -9,792 ** -5,146 * 
Widowed -15,886 ** -7,922 ** 
Never Married -8,513 * -5,977  
Partnered -18,354 ** -13,067 ** 
Male 1,464  358  
Black -12,887  -8,432  
Other non-white -9,549  -4,218  
Age, year yes  yes  
Income + other controls no  yes  
Mean Dep. 19,949  19,949  
Observations 71,128  71,128  
Source:  HRS 1992-2006. 
Notes: Sample is individuals not changing marital status in consecutive waves, excluding unknown married 





Table 5. Model Results for Wealth Change Among Individuals Not Changing Marital Status By Sex 
 
 Wealth Change 
 Men  Women 
 Marginal effects  Marginal effects 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (1)  Model (2)  
[Married]         
Remarried -4,012  -3,245  -4,806 * -3,054  
Divorced -5,136  -368  -12,397 ** -7,390 * 
Widowed -8,227  -4,133  -17,948 ** -9,172 ** 
Never Married -8,128  -7,400  -9,174  -5,740  
Partnered -18,825 ** -13,355 * -17,824 ** -12,591 * 
Black -15,232  -10,134  -11,210  -7,252  
Other non-white -9,968  -3,748  -9,087  -4,452  
Age, year yes  yes  yes  yes  
Income + controls no  yes  no  yes  
Mean Dep. 21,986  21,986  18,312  18,312  
Observations 31,685  31,685  39,443  39,443  
Source:  HRS 1992-2006. 
Notes: Sample is individuals not changing marital status in consecutive waves, excluding unknown married 




Table 6a.  Wealth Change Among Individuals Changing and Not Changing Marital Status 
 
   Mstat 
Mstat Change 




t-1 & t 
Mstat at 






Married  Divorced 95 291,125 251,206 118,428 140,638 -39,918 -132,779 22,210 62,128 
Separated  Divorced 60 160,531 117,673 161,568 171,434 -42,858 43,895 9,866 52,724 
Married  Widowed 1,518 241,539 240,363 228,761 229,410 -1,176 -11,602 649 1,826 
Divorced  Married 67 154,940 190,505 255,293 278,591 35,565 64,789 23,298 -12,267 
Widowed  Married 65 288,861 312,180 447,799 508,835 23,318 135,619 61,036 37,718 
Single  Married 76 264,758 310,712 384,774 398,305 45,954 74,061 13,531 -32,423 
Married Married 38,129 334,700 354,144 374,555 399,985 19,444 20,411 25,430 5,986 
Divorced  Divorced 3,823 135,639 146,657 152,885 169,882 11,019 6,227 16,997 5,978 
Widowed Widowed 8,276 170,562 174,701 171,482 170,578 4,140 -3,219 -904 -5,044 
Single Single 2,298 169,071 182,858 195,303 212,353 13,786 12,445 17,050 3,264 
Source:  HRS 1992-2006 
Notes:  Sample is individuals changing marital status and in four consecutive waves of data.   
Wealth in $2006.  Single is never married and partnered.  Trimmed top and bottom 2% of Δ. 
 
Table 6b.   
 
   Between wave change as % of prior wave wealth 
Mstat at 
t-1 & t 
Mstat at 
t+1 & t+2 N [(t)-(t-1)/t-1]*100 [(t+1)-(t)/t]*100 [(t+2)-(t+1)/t+1]*100 
Married  Divorced 95 -13.7 -52.9 18.8 
Separated  Divorced 60 -26.7 37.3 6.1 
Married  Widowed 1,518 -0.5 -4.8 0.3 
Divorced  Married 67 23.0 34.0 9.1 
Widowed  Married 65 8.1 43.4 13.6 
Single Married 76 17.4 23.8 3.5 
Married Married 38,129 5.8 5.8 6.8 
Divorced  Divorced 3,823 8.1 4.2 11.1 
Widowed Widowed 8,276 2.4 -1.8 -0.5 
Single Single 2,298 8.2 6.8 8.7 
Source:  HRS 1992-2006 
Notes:  Sample is individuals changing marital status and in four consecutive waves of data.   




Table 7. Model of Change in Wealth Change Before (t)-(t-1) and After (t+2)-(t+1) Marital Status Change 
 
  Total Wealth ((t+2)-(t+1)) – ((t)-(t-1)) 
  Marginal Effects 
  All  stderr Male  stderr Female stderr 
Intercept  29,660 9,686 42,263 17,152 23,008 11,725 
Marital Status  in 
(t) & (t-1): 
Marital Status  
(t+2) & (t+1): 
            
[Married] [Married]             
Divorced Divorced -912 4,981 -4,415 9,432 1,098 5,806 
Widowed Widowed -3,266 4,040 -4,175 9,795 -3,049 4,598 
Other Single Other Single -1,963 6,270 -1,214 9,988 -2,807 8,051 
Married Divorced 46,858 29,986 41,494 48,045 50,478 38,265 
Separated Divorced 46,828 37,706 72,508 64,724 31,900 46,002 
Married Widowed 3,494 7,772 -2,844 15,933 5,058 8,760 
Divorced Married -17,606 35,677 -54,418 48,631 33,944 53,570 
Widowed Married 31,907 36,224 -9,202 56,381 65,841 47,262 
Other Single Married -40,975 33,526 -53,532 49,289 -26,563 46,017 
Age  -539 145 -712 254 -444 181 
Male  730 2,641         
Income change ((t+2)-(t+1)) – ((t)-(t-1)) 0.208 0.011 0.241 0.020 0.191 0.014 
Four consecutive data waves are:       
1992/93, 1994/95, 1996, and 1998 7,621 3,724 9,767 6,036 6,147 4,716 
1994/1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000 27,184 4,300 28,725 6,773 25,982 5,570 
1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 -16,883 3,866 -21,953 6,273 -13,277 4,889 
2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006 34,785 3,745 39,111 6,084 31,771 4,732 
Mean Dependent  4,188  5,774  3,058  
Observations  54,407  22,629  31778  
Source:  HRS 1992-2006. 
Notes: Sample is individuals in four consecutive waves, excluding unknown married (339 obs), birth 1947 
and earlier.  Dependent variable, ‘change in wealth change’ excludes wealth changes between the waves in 
which the marital transitions occurs (t and t+1) and values in the top & bottom 2% are trimmed.  Age is 




Appendix Table A: Model Results for Wealth Change Among Individuals Not Changing Marital Status 
 
 All Males Females 
 df/dx stdder df/dx stdder df/dx stdder 
Intercept -57,162 33,749 -71,127 50,861 -57,368 46,266 
Male 358 1,442         
Remarried -3,240 1,795 -3,245 2,636 -3,054 2,473 
Divorced -5,146 2,520 -368 4,430 -7,390 3,101 
Widowed -7,923 2,680 -4,133 6,510 -9,172 2,995 
Never Married -5,977 4,758 -7,400 8,007 -5,740 5,886 
Partnered -13,067 4,231 -13,355 6,231 -12,591 5,790 
Age 2,486 1,099 2,730 1,651 2,608 1,499 
Age-squared -25 9 -27 14 -27 13 
Less high school -4,773 1,873 -4,953 2,953 -4,794 2,420 
Some college 4,317 1,913 5,631 2,943 3,449 2,514 
College 20,664 2,063 19,778 3,147 22,027 2,735 
Black -8,432 1,995 -10,134 3,271 -7,252 2,508 
Other non-white -4,218 3,544 -3,748 5,668 -4,452 4,523 
No kids 1,237 4,558 4,873 7,086 -1,962 6,058 
4 or more kids -1,669 1,522 -2,972 2,373 -761 1,978 
Mortality risk: dev. from lifetable:       
Living 10-19 more yrs 76 30 106 47 58 39 
Living 20-29 more yrs 60 51 47 90 64 61 
Least risk averse 1,504 2,264 3,891 3,510 -629 2,959 
Third most risk averse 1,022 2,409 2,499 3,756 -94 3,132 
Second most risk averse 3,834 2,269 3,311 3,516 4,273 2,964 
5-10yr financial planning horizon 215 1,652 835 2,555 -47 2,163 
10+ yr financial planning horizon 2,538 2,545 2,259 3,933 2,931 3,336 
HH earnings quintile 2  -747 2,165 -1,021 3,367 -532 2,856 
HH earnings quintile 3  -4,547 2,291 -1,779 3,521 -5,581 2,978 
HH earnings quintile 4  -6,946 2,395 -3,667 3,674 -6,874 3,150 
HH earnings quintile 5  10,518 2,523 7,312 3,888 10,547 3,330 
PDV lifetime earnings quintile 2  4,780 7,788 9,979 14,776 4,705 9,079 
PDV lifetime earnings quintile 3  4,596 7,823 6,202 14,809 2,691 9,137 
PDV lifetime earnings quintile 4  3,608 7,857 8,357 14,836 1,711 9,188 
PDV lifetime earnings quintile 5  14,103 7,915 19,372 14,886 12,075 9,293 
Household has DB pension 8,708 2,215 9,243 3,391 8,522 2,928 
Household has DC pension 10,758 2,247 12,496 3,441 9,629 2,966 
Household has DB&DC pension 28,930 2,579 30,641 3,863 27,808 3,469 
Birth Cohort 1942-1947 -3,671 2,592 -4,255 3,997 -3,165 3,407 
Y1992 5,721 2,769 6,116 4,284 5,280 3,625 
Y1994 -6,385 2,725 -6,696 4,228 -6,114 3,557 
Y1996 16,649 2,687 20,649 4,161 13,392 3,509 
Y1998 15,586 2,525 17,904 3,921 13,482 3,295 
Y2002 15,402 2,554 17,277 3,978 13,990 3,321 
Y2004 24,116 2,643 26,741 4,137 22,256 3,425 
N 71,128  31,685  39,443  
Source:  HRS 1992-2006. 
Notes: Sample is individuals not changing marital status in consecutive waves, excluding unknown married 





Appendix Table B. Means of model covariates from Tables 4 and 5 
 
  All Males Females 
Male 0.445 1.000 0.000 
Remarried 0.231 0.268 0.201 
Divorced 0.095 0.068 0.117 
Widowed 0.086 0.029 0.132 
Never Married 0.029 0.026 0.031 
Partnered 0.029 0.032 0.026 
Age 59.634 59.526 59.721 
Less high school 0.239 0.226 0.249 
Some college 0.200 0.203 0.197 
College 0.182 0.190 0.175 
Black 0.155 0.133 0.173 
Other non-white 0.040 0.038 0.043 
No kids 0.059 0.064 0.055 
4 or more kids 0.393 0.387 0.397 
Mortality risk: dev. from lifetable:     
Living 10-19 more yrs -4.827 -2.979 -6.311 
Living 20-29 more yrs -3.630 -2.675 -4.397 
Least risk averse 0.111 0.112 0.110 
Third most risk averse 0.095 0.094 0.096 
Second most risk averse 0.110 0.111 0.110 
5-10yr financial plan horizon 0.273 0.287 0.261 
10+ yr financial plan horizon 0.086 0.088 0.085 
Current earnings  30,059 31,804 28,669 
PDV lifetime earnings  813,044 893,356 747,993 
Household has DB pension 0.149 0.153 0.146 
Household has DC pension 0.137 0.141 0.134 
Household has DB&DC pension 0.112 0.123 0.104 
Birth Cohort 1942-1947 0.115 0.120 0.112 
Y1992 0.146 0.150 0.144 
Y1994 0.138 0.139 0.137 
Y1996 0.132 0.132 0.131 
Y1998 0.155 0.156 0.153 
Y2002 0.145 0.143 0.147 
Y2004 0.138 0.133 0.141 
Number of Observations 71,128 31,685 39,443 
Source:  HRS 1992-2006. 
Notes: Sample is individuals not changing marital status in consecutive waves, excluding unknown married 
(339 obs), birth cohorts 1931-1947. Earnings in $2006 
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